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I. Introduction
by Jourlande Gabriel
Recently, the relatively dry subject of
retirement systems for employees of
state and local government has
become the focus of increasing
attention from the media and
policymakers.1  Given the size and
scope of public pension systems, this
attention is welcome.  According to the
U.S. Department of Labor, state and
local governments employ 16 million
workers, approximately 10 percent of
the nation's workforce.2 These em-
ployees provide a broad range of
essential public services, such as
teaching at and supporting public
schools and universities, policing
streets, fighting fires, guarding
prisons and jails, and protecting
public health and the environment.
State and local pension systems
distribute more than $130 billion
annually to over six million retired
public workers and beneficiaries,3  and
by the end of September 2005, held
assets of $2.66 trillion.4
The primary reason public retire-
ment systems are receiving increased
scrutiny is growing concern over the
fiscal capacity of the public sector  —
at all levels — to fund promised
pension benefits. This concern over
fiscal capacity is well-founded. How-
ever, misinformation and inaccura-
cies have dominated the general
debate over the cause of the fiscal
Dismantling the Public Sector Pension “Crisis”
strains as well as the identification of
alternatives for resolving these fiscal
issues, much of which stem from
frequently repeated suggestions that
public sector retirement benefit
systems should mirror those in the
private sector.
While this line of thinking is
superficially appealing to many — if
something is good for businesses, why
not government — it ignores the
substantial differences between the
public and private sectors. One
fundamental difference involves profit
motive.  The private sector, appropri-
ately, focuses its decision making on
individual profit maximization. All
other considerations are secondary, at
best.  The public sector, however, is
focused on the public good.  Hence,
much of the public sector's prov-
enance, like caring for the impover-
ished and promoting public safety, is
particularly void of anything related
to profit maximization.
This in turn leads to a very
different relationship between work-
ers and their employers in the private
versus public sectors. A private
business' relationship with a worker
ends immediately and completely
upon the termination of that worker's
employment. Not so in the public
sector. If a former employee of a
governmental entity earns post-
retirement income that is insufficient
to sustain him or herself, the public
sector has the obligation to continue
assisting its former worker through
various social services.
The public sector must also
compete with the private sector for
quality workers. Consequently, retire-
ment and other benefit packages are
crucial recruitment tools for the public
sector.  This is especially the case for
those public service careers that
either: (i) are low paying, at least in
relative terms when compared to the
private sector, for workers with
similar levels of educational attain-
ment, such as teachers; or (ii) involve
dangerous activities, such as police,
fire fighters and in many cases, social
workers, who must deal with difficult
and frequently violent situations.
Often, these and other differences
between the public and private sectors
are glossed over or ignored in the
pension debate.  The result is overly
simplistic criticisms of existing public
benefit systems, that: (i) ignore the
true causes of and overstate the
severity of fiscal imbalances in public
pension systems; or (ii) incorrectly
assess long term costs to taxpayers
and the relative merits of defined
benefit versus defined contribution
retirement plans for public sector
employers and workers alike.
Robert C. Long's recent article,
"The Changing Nature of Pension
Plans and Retiree Medical Benefits:
What the Private Sector Experience
Portends for the Looming Crisis in the
Public Sector"5   is a typical example of
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the misinformation clouding the
debate on public employee pension
benefits. Long contends that the public
sector's continued provision of defined
benefit pension plans is anachronistic,
expensive and noncompetitive, prima-
rily because it ignores the private
sector trend to supplant defined
benefit systems with defined contribu-
tion systems.  Long further contends
that if the public sector would switch
to defined contribution systems, state
and local governments will start
climbing out from the fiscal problems
they experience funding retirement
systems.
While the arguments in Long's
article have superficial appeal, a closer
review of the data reveal that his
analysis of and proposed remedies to
public pension funding problems are
seriously off-point and should not be
followed by public sector employers.
Jourlande Gabriel joined the Center for
Tax and Budget Accountability staff in
March 2007, as the Director of the
Illinois Retirement Security Initiative.
Currently her work focuses upon ensur-
ing that public retirement benefits in
the state of Illinois are adequately
financed and designed to attract high
quality employees to the public sector.
Prior to joining the Center for Tax
and Budget Accountability, Ms. Gabriel
served as a Judicial Clerk within the
Orleans Parish Civil District Court
researching and drafting orders and
opinions for pending civil and criminal
matters. She studied Comparative Con-
stitutional Law at Cambridge Univer-
sity under former Chief Justice William
Rehnquist and was granted certification
in Mediation and Arbitration by
Humboldt University School of Law in
Berlin, Germany.
Ms. Gabriel earned her JD from
Tulane University Law School in May
2006 and received her B.A. in philosophy
from Xavier University of Louisiana.
The fundamental flaws in the
arguments of commentators like Long
include the following, each of which is
reviewed at length in this article:
•The private sector's move to
defined contribution systems is
inapplicable to the public sector,
because it occurred predominately
among small and midsized, not
large employers, and for tax/cost
reasons that pertain solely to the
private sector.
•Although some public pension
systems are significantly
underfunded, there in fact is no
general, nationwide public pension
funding crisis.
• Switching to defined contribution
systems will not reduce accrued
underfunding in existing public
pension systems by one cent.
•Defined contribution systems are
more costly for taxpayers than
defined benefit systems.
•Defined contribution systems can
be expected to provide retirees with
inadequate benefits.
•Moving to predominately defined
contribution systems will greatly
diminish the public sector's ability
to attract quality employees.
.
For the better part of the 20th century,
most employer sponsored retirement
plans, both in the private and public
sectors, were defined benefit systems.6
Under a defined benefit system, the
employer guarantees an annual
retirement payment for a worker that
is based on a formula,7 usually in-
volving such factors as an employee's
years of service, age at retirement and
either ending salary or average salary
over the last few years of service.8 The
annual retirement payment benefit is
II. The Private Sector’s
Move Towards Defined
Contribution Systems
typically guaranteed for the life of the
employee and his or her spouse.9
These formula-determined retirement
benefits are funded from three sources:
(i) employee contributions; (ii) em-
ployer contributions; and (iii) invest-
ment earnings on pension fund
assets.10   All employer and employee
contributions and investment returns
are pooled, and the assets are
collectively managed.  The employer
maintains responsibility for manag-
ing the plan and for ensuring adequate
funding is available for payment of
benefits when due.11
Over the last decade, however,
many private sector employers have
moved towards defined contribution
systems. Defined contribution plans
offer no guaranteed benefit on
retirement. Instead, they create a
retirement savings account for each
individual member, such as under a
401(k) plan.12  The ultimate retire-
ment benefit is the accumulated value
of an individual's account available at
retirement, resulting from contribu-
tions made to the account by the
participant and his or her employer,
increased by investment earnings and
decreased by losses over time.13  The
employee is responsible for investing
his or her own retirement account, but
must typically pay a third party to
administer it.14   Employees make all
decisions about where to invest
retirement savings and how much to
contribute. It follows that the em-
ployee assumes all market and timing
risks concerning the assets in an
individual defined contribution ac-
count.  It is therefore possible for an
employee to both outlive the accumu-
lated assets in the account, and/or to
lose all of it in a turbulent market.
Neither of those unfortunate contin-
gencies pertains in a defined benefit
setting.
As Long correctly notes, from 1985
to 2002, the number of defined
contribution systems implemented in
the private sector grew significantly,
3
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from 12 million to 52.9 million.15   By
contrast, over the same period the
number of public sector defined benefit
plans remained relatively stable,16
with the number of such plans that
include 10,000 or more active
participants actually increasing by 13
percent.17 Long and advocates of
defined contribution systems point to
the aforementioned private sector
trend in favor of defined contribution
plans as compelling evidence of the
undue cost and uncompetitiveness of
defined benefit systems, and as the
primary reason the public sector
should abandon defined benefit sys-
tems for defined contribution
systems.18 Certainly, the numbers
appear dramatic; however, closer
inspection of the private sector's move
to defined contribution systems
demonstrates that the trend is
irrelevant from the public sector's
standpoint.
Much of the increased utilization
of defined contribution systems in
private industry was caused by the
passage of the Employment Retire-
ment Income Security Act ("ERISA").19
ERISA established standards for
defined benefit plan participation,
vesting, retirement, and reporting;
and imposed a tax on defined benefit
plans to fund the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC").20
Subsequently, ERISA regulations
were made even more stringent
through the addition of amendments,
particularly the Multiemployer Pen-
sion Plan Amendments of 1980, the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982 and the Tax Reform Act of
1986. These changes reduced or
eliminated incentives to private sector
employers offering defined benefit
plans, and increased the liability,
expense, or regulatory requirements of
maintaining a private sector defined
benefit plan.21
As a reaction to the imposition of
these new standards and costs, many
small to midsized private sector
businesses moved away from defined
benefit systems toward defined contri-
bution systems.22    However, state and
local government pension plans are
not subject to most ERISA regulations
and amendments.23     Moreover, public
plans are not required to make
payments to the PGBC.24    As a result,
the primary factor - ERISA - that
pushed the private sector toward
defined contribution plans does not
even apply to state and local
governments. Consequently, the pri-
vate sector trend, as dramatic as it
may be, holds little relevance for
government employers.
Interestingly, even after the
ERISA motivated shift to defined
contribution systems in the private
sector, large, private business pre-
dominantly continued to use defined
benefit systems.25   Fully 75 percent of
the Fortune 500 still use defined
benefit plans as their main retirement
benefit system.26  Public sector em-
ployers are typically large employers.
If  large employers in the private sector
still favor defined benefit systems
despite the added costs and adminis-
trative burdens imposed by ERISA,
there seems to be no reason for the
public sector, which does not have
those costs and burdens, to abandon
defined benefit systems. This is
especially so, given the higher
administration costs that defined
contribution systems would impose on
taxpayers and the public sector's need
to attract quality workers, both of
which are discussed in more detail
below.
III. The Absence of a Gen-
eral Nationwide Public
Pension Funding Crisis
One reason commentators like Long
push for the public sector to move to
defined contribution systems is the
frequently cited "crisis" in public
system funding.27 Long, along with
others, point to the $700 billion
aggregate, combined unfunded liabil-
ity of all public retirement systems as
evidence of a massive, fiscal crisis.28
However, the gross dollar value of an
unfunded liability by itself does not
reveal much. To have real meaning,
unfunded liability must be compared
with the resources available to fund
the obligations.29
In actuality, "funded ratio" – that
is, the percentage of accrued pension
liabilities currently funded with
pension system assets – provides a
much more accurate barometer of the
health of public pension systems.
According to the Public Fund Survey,
the average funded ratio for more than
100 of the nation's largest public plans
was 87 percent in 2005, with two
thirds of the plans at least 80 percent
funded.30   While a handful of plans are
significantly underfunded, with funded
ratios below 60 percent, the financial
health of plans covering the vast
majority of pubic employees are
sound.31
The Public Fund Survey, like
Long, also pegs the aggregate un-
funded liability of all public plans at
$336 billion.32 However, according to
the United States Federal Reserve,
public pension plans as a whole have
accumulated $2.7 trillion in assets to
pay benefits.33 Taken together, that
means the "massive" $336 billion
unfunded liabilities represent only 13
percent of the total liabilities for all the
plans surveyed.34  Pension liabilities
are long-term liabilities that are
typically amortized over 30 years,
similar to a mortgage.35  In common
sense terms, it seems highly unlikely
homeowners who had paid 87 percent
of their mortgages, with 30 years left
to pay the remainder would consider
themselves to be in a financial crisis,
especially if, like government, their
ongoing revenue was guaranteed not
only to continue, but increase, over the
coming 30-year period.
This is not to say that some
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pension plans don't face serious
underfunding problems. They do.
However, the underfunding has been
mainly due to the applicable govern-
ment employer not making its
required contribution, rather than to
any intrinsic cost of or problems with
defined benefit plans generally.  For
example, Illinois state government is
facing a $40.7 billion dollar unfunded
liability in the aggregate for its five
public employee systems, the largest
in the nation.36 Illinois' outsized,
unfunded liability is not due to overly
generous benefits; according to U.S.
census data, the average monthly
pension payment to state government
employees nationally was $1,374 in
2001-2002.37 At the same time, the
average Illinois payment was $1,426, a
difference of just 3.7 percent.38  Nor
was it the normal cost of the systems
that caused the unfunded liability; the
average normal cost nationally, as a
percentage of active member payroll,
is 12.5 percent, while the weighted
average of the normal cost across all
five Illinois systems is 9.3 percent,
well below average.39   Of course, public
employees in Illinois have paid their
required contributions to the plan over
time; teachers in Illinois pay 9.4
percent of their salary to the pension
system, the highest in the nation.40
The only weak link, and the true cause
of the large unfunded liability in
Illinois, is the state's irresponsible
decision to underfund its required
employer contributions for decades.41
Even if a government employer is one
of the few facing serious unfunded
liabilities in its pension system,
switching to a defined contribution
plan will not reduce its unfunded
liability by one red cent.  In virtually
all instances, pension benefits owed to
current and former state and local
government employees may not
legally be reduced.42 Since most
government pension plans are pro-
tected against diminution by state
constitution or statutes, switching to a
defined contribution plan cannot
reduce any unfunded liability accrued
under existing defined benefit pro-
grams.43
At best, switching to a defined
contribution plan can apply prospec-
tively, either to new hires that join the
public sector workforce after the
pension system changes, or to current
employees who exercise an option to
transfer into a new defined contribu-
tion plan going forward.44   In either
case, however, the existing unfunded
liability remains intact, and still must
be funded dollar for dollar irrespective
of the plan change.
Although it may not address existing
unfunded liability, if moving from a
defined benefit to defined contribution
system held the promise of saving
significant taxpayer expense, while
still providing adequate retirement
benefits and ensuring quality public
sector employees, such a shift should
certainly be explored. The problem is
defined contribution plans are more
costly to establish and maintain than
defined benefit plans.45   First, there
are the added start-up costs associated
with any new defined contribution
plan.  It must be designed, vendors
must be selected, and its operation
must be monitored.46   In addition,
employees must be educated about
plan features and available invest-
ments, because now the responsibility
to make investment decisions rests
with the workers, rather than
fiduciaries.47   For example, the budget
IV. Switching to D. C. Sys-
tems Will Not Reduce Ac-
crued Under Funding in
Public Pension Systems
V. Moving to D. C. Systems
Will Lead to Higher Costs
for Florida's defined contribution plan,
which was established in 2000, totaled
$89 million from FY 2001 through FY
2004. This included $55 million to
educate Florida's 650,000 government
employees about the new plan.48   Staff
time is spent throughout the process,
and the sponsoring governments must
pay additional legal and consulting
fees.49   If a third party administrator
is not hired for the plan, the
government employer must do this as
well. Even if a third party administra-
tor is hired, the government will still
have significant operating costs
related to the defined contribution
plan.50
Administrative costs are signifi-
cantly greater for government employ-
ers and taxpayers in a defined
contribution than in defined benefit
setting.51  According to the Investment
Management Institute, the operating
expense ratio for defined benefit plans
averages 31 basis points (31 cents per
$100 of assets); the average for defined
contribution plans is three to six times
higher at 96 to 175 basis points.52   To
put that in context of the Illinois
pension systems, the administrative
costs of a defined contribution system
would in all likelihood be anywhere
from $265 million to $586 million more
expensive annually than the state's
current defined benefit systems.
In the mid 1960's, Nebraska
switched from a defined benefit to a
defined contribution plan for state and
county government employees.  Imme-
diately, that state noted it was paying
higher administrative costs for its
new, defined contribution system.53
Over time, Nebraska found that, when
compared to its defined benefit plan,
the new defined contribution plan cost
the state significantly more in
investment management fess, record-
keeping fees, educational programs
and other administrative line items.54
In 1999, Nebraska’s administrative
expenses for its defined contribution




There is also a potentially signifi-
cant indirect cost for taxpayers to bear
when shifting to a defined contribution
plan, that involves normal cost and
investment returns. The "normal
cost" of a pension system is the
contribution required from an em-
ployer to fund the plan's benefits.  In a
defined contribution setting, the
normal cost is simply what percentage
of a worker's pay the government
employer has promised to contribute to
that worker's retirement account,
together with any match.  In a defined
benefit setting, however, normal cost
is the annual percentage of total
payroll a government employer must
contribute to fund the promised benefit
for its current workforce, based on
actuarial tables.  This contribution
can be funded from a combination of
tax revenue and investment returns
earned on plan assets, if the returns
are high enough to cover anticipated
benefits, plus a portion of the
employer's current normal cost
contribution. In the defined contribu-
tion setting, investment returns
belong solely to the employee who
makes the investment in his or her
retirement account, and are not
available to reduce the employer
contribution.56 Frequently,fully-
funded defined benefit plans attain
high enough investment returns that
public sector employers are able to
reduce the amount of normal cost paid
from tax collections, freeing taxpayer
revenue to cover services.57  This cost
savings can be significant, as the
experience of the Illinois Municipal
Retirement Fund (IMRF) demon-
strates.
The IMRF, the second largest
pension fund in Illinois covering public
employees such as bus drivers, sewer
workers and municipal administra-
tors, has enjoyed a funding advantage
for years, in large part because it has
relentlessly  demanded full and on
time payments from member govern-
ment employers and employees.58    As
a result, the IMRF has consistently
maintained high levels of funding.59
As of December 31, 2006, IMRF was
100.5 percent funded on an actuarial
basis.60   Because of this, government
employers within the IMRF will enjoy
lower contribution rates in 2007.61
Rates will fall from an average 10.04
percent in 2006 to 9.72 percent this
year, saving taxpayers millions.62
The data show simply maintain-
ing a well-funded defined benefit
system can save significant taxpayer
dollars over time.  It is unclear why
proponents of defined contribution
systems are so eager to impose
additional costs on taxpayers —
especially when, as analyzed below,
the benefits generated for workers will
be lower.
VI. D. C. Systems Provide
Inadequate Benefits
A switch to a defined contribution
system bears negative implications for
not only employers and taxpayers, but
also workers. The Center for Retire-
ment Research at Boston College
("CRR") found that in 2001, the
average 401(k)/IRA account balance of
individuals nearing retirement (ages
55-64) was $42,000, whereas CRR's
modeling indicated that a regular
middle-income contributor should
have accumulated almost $300,000 by
that age.63   If a worker retires at 65
years of age, and lives until 85 with
only $42,000 in retirement savings,
that would leave just $175 per month
or $2,100 per year, to cover costs for
the remainder of his or her life, not
nearly enough on which to survive.64
At the same time, the average state
and local government employee
defined benefit is $1,374 per month or
$16,488 per year,65  hardly abundant,
especially considering 28 percent of
state and local government employees
are not eligible to receive Social
Security.66
There are multiple reasons bal-
ances available at retirement under a
defined contribution plan are so low.
Unlike defined benefit plans, partici-
pation is not mandatory under a
defined contribution plan.67 Studies
show 25 percent of employees choose
not to participate at all in 401(k)
defined contribution programs when
offered, leaving them with no private
savings.68  In addition, CRR found that
less than 10 percent of workers with
defined contribution plans actually
contribute the maximum allowed.69
Inexperience and lack of invest-
ment training also contribute to low
account balances. The state of
Nebraska found that when employees
managed their own investments
under that state's defined contribution
plan, investment returns were lower
than under the state's defined benefit
system.70 From 1983 to 1999, Ne-
braska state and county workers
averaged a 6 percent return when
investing their individual retirement
accounts in that state's defined
contribution plan, versus the 11
percent return for teachers and judges
under Nebraska's defined benefit
plan.71 The actual investment differ-
ential in favor of the defined benefit
system becomes even greater once the
lower administrative costs of the
defined benefit system are factored
in.72 One key reason public defined
contribution plan returns lag defined
benefit portfolios is simple, asset
allocations made by employees in a
defined contribution setting are often
quite conservative.73 Again, the
Nebraska experience is illustrative.
Despite state education programs on
the importance of proper asset
allocation and eleven different invest-
ment options, 90 percent of Nebraska's
employees invested all their individual
plan deposits in just three of the eleven
available fund choices.74  This suggests
employees lack the proper skills to
diversify their assets and make sound
investments.  Under a defined benefit
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system, experienced portfolio manag-
ers invest plan assets under carefully
considered asset allocation models
geared toward long term returns.
Anna Sullivan, the director of
Nebraska's Public Employees Retire-
ment System observed that members
were making decisions based on
emotions and trying to time the
market by chasing returns.75  In the
end the majority of them were left with
barely anything to live on following
retirement.
The bottom line was clear,
Nebraska found that ten years after
retirement, a retiree in that state's
defined contribution plan with 30
years of service and an average annual
salary of $30,000, had about $11,230
annually in retirement benefits,76
which is $2,460 less than the poverty
level for a family of two. Participants
in Nebraska's defined benefit plan
with similar pay and service credit,
however, had an annual retirement
benefit of $16,797,77  which is $3,100
more than the poverty level for a
family of two.
Faced with irrefutable data
illustrating that defined contribution
systems provide lower benefits for
employees at higher costs to taxpay-
ers, Nebraska legislators changed
back to a defined benefit model in
2002.78 This effectively ended the
state's defined contribution plan for
new hires, while giving all other
workers the option to switch into a
hybrid plan. "We had to take a look in
the mirror and think, is this really
providing a true pension?" said
Sullivan.  "It's really sad what they
retire with. It's nothing compared to
what people in our defined benefit plan
receive."79 Sullivan sums up
Nebraska's experience by stating,
"Our experience with the defined
contribution plan has been mixed. We
have had over 35 years to ‘test’ this
experiment and find generally that our
defined contribution plan members
retire with lower benefits than their
defined benefit plan counterparts."80
While the chief purpose of employer
sponsored retirement benefits is not to
make workers rich, it is to at least
promote retirement security, some-
thing the data show a defined
contribution system generally fails to
accomplish.
VII. D. C. Systems Diminish
the Public Sector’s Ability to
Attract Quality Employees
In addition to retirement security,
employer sponsored pension benefits
have long been part of the overall
compensation package used to attract
and retain qualified employees.81
Eliminating defined benefit plans from
compensation packages would dimin-
ish the public sector's ability to
compete with the private sector in
obtaining and retaining quality
workers.
Since the public sector generally
does not pay salaries competitive with
the private sector for similar levels of
credentials, a defined benefit plan is an
effective tool for recruiting and
retaining high quality civil servants,
many of whom are in typically lower
paid but vital and high risk jobs.82
These workers fight fires, protect our
streets, educate our children and
provide medical care.  Certainly, it is
in the public interest to attract
workers with a high level of skill to fill
these and other positions. Decent
pension benefits can create an
especially important recruitment ad-
vantage for the public sector today, as
the private sector continues to reduce
benefits over time.83   Long ignores this
reality by relying on faulty reports
that indicate public sector workers are
relatively highly compensated84 —  a
conclusion that can only be reached
when data is manipulated to exclude
the level of credentialing attained.85
This is both disingenuous and
counterproductive.
Demographic changes, particu-
larly the aging of the workforce, are
making pension benefits an even more
crucial tool for attracting quality
workers than in the past.  In a recent
study, Deloitte Consulting ("Deloitte")
identified significant workforce short-
ages that will materialize in the labor
market due to the aging population.
Deloitte found that, because more than
10,000 baby boomers are now turning
55 years old every day, for the first
time in history, the number of workers
entering the labor market will not
replace those that are leaving.86
Deloitte projects that the number of
workers age 25 to 34 will shrink by
almost 9 percent from 2006 to 2016,
leading to a total labor shortage of 10
million by 2010, and 35 million by
2030.87
In addition to a general labor
shortage, there looms a significant
skills shortage, as revealed by the
decrease in university graduation
rates. From 1998 through 2002,
graduation rates at public universities
fell by 7 percent.88 By 2012, it is
expected that employers will need 6
million more four-year degree candi-
dates to fill jobs than will be available
in the labor market.89   In short, as
baby boomers retire, much of the
future workforce is anticipated to lack
the skills and education necessary to
fill the vacated positions.90  As a result
of this national talent shortfall, there
will be heightened competition be-
tween the public and the private
sectors to attract qualified candidates.
This will require government employ-
ers to offer either higher salaries or
better benefit packages than in the
past to attract and keep talented
workers.  Conversely, if the public
sector were to scale back pension
benefits or follow the private sector
trend to utilize defined contribution
plans, government employers may
find themselves at a significant
competitive disadvantage to the
private sector in attracting qualified
7
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and skilled workers, leading to a
decline in quality of public services.
Moreover, a majority of public
sector positions are best served when
those who occupy them are career
oriented or at least remain in them for
ten years or longer.91  Two-thirds of
public employees are classified by the
United States Census Bureau as
judicial, firefighters, police officers
and support, corrections, or educa-
tional.92   It is only common sense that
the taxpaying public benefits when
individuals remain in these positions
for an extended period - long enough to
enable the employer and taxpayers to
realize a return on the investment
made to train the employee to serve the
public in these difficult tasks.
Moreover, taxpayers are well served
when public sector positions are filled
with skilled and qualified personnel,
rather than inexperienced workers
who are learning on the job.  Retention
of qualified workers is a primary
reason that public sector employers
continue to offer defined benefit plans –
these benefits create an incentive for
career oriented workers to remain in
their positions.93
In that regard, several states
which previously switched to defined
contribution plans reverted back to
defined benefit plans.  Even North
Dakota, which originally established
its pension system as a defined
contribution model, changed to a
defined benefit system specifically
because of the need to attract and
retain quality employees.94  In May
2005, West Virginia passed legislation
to allow teachers under that state's
defined contribution plan to transfer
into a defined benefit plan.95  State
representatives said the change would
help prevent teachers from leaving
their jobs.96
The data clearly indicate that
provision of decent retirement benefits
is an essential element in the public
sector's ability to recruit and retain
employees in important and high-risk
occupations. In the absence of offering
decent benefit plans to remain
competitive with the private sector,
public employers will be required to
make adjustments in compensation
packages offered.  Such adjustments
might include improved working
conditions, other benefits, or higher
pay.  It is unrealistic to think that the
behavior of current and future public
employees will not change if their
compensation packages are signifi-
cantly diminished.
VIII. Conclusion
Commentators like Robert C. Long
have a clear belief the public sector is
making an anachronistic, fiscally
unsound and noncompetitive mistake
by offering defined benefit retirement
plans to workers.   Under their line of
thinking, state and local governments
ought to eschew this expensive
approach to retirement security, and
move public employee pension systems
to the defined contribution model.  Yet,
a thorough review of the data reveal
that this argument relies on selective
use of statistics, designed more to
scare and misinform than illuminate.
Want to scare decision makers
and voters? Point out that the
aggregate unfunded liability across all
state and local pension plans exceeds
the eye-opening sum of $366 billion.
That will get attention. Just make
sure you fail to point out that these
same pension funds have nearly $2.7
trillion in assets, making them over 87
percent funded.  Why provide needed
context to evaluate pension fiscal
capacity honestly, when you can
manipulate a statistic out of context to
push your preconceived conclusion?
 Better yet, argue that defined
benefit systems are not competitive in
the private market place.  Everyone
likes competitive practices.  For this
argument to sound plausible, how-
ever, you have to neglect mentioning
that the reason many small and
midsized businesses moved to defined
contribution systems, ERISA, does not
apply to the public sector.  You also
have to ignore the fact that most large
private employers have kept defined
benefit plants, and that government is
a large employer.  To really make this
argument framed around "competi-
tiveness" stick, you have to fail to
mention that the public sector
competes with the private sector for
workers, that it pays less salary than
the private sector does to workers with
similar qualifications, that Deloitte
has noted the nation has a growing
shortage of skilled workers available,
and that providing defined benefit
pension plans is a key compensation
element used by the public sector to
compete with the private sector for
workers.
Next, claim defined benefit sys-
tems are too expensive for taxpayers,
because everyone wants to reduce
taxpayer costs.  Never mind that
administrative costs under defined
contribution systems are three to six
times higher than under defined
benefit systems.  And just what do
taxpayers get for paying higher costs?
Lower benefits for workers.  Those
states that have extensive experience
with switching to a defined contribu-
tion system, like Nebraska, found the
average annual retirement benefit
former workers received was below the
federal poverty level.
It is time to stop misleading voters
and decision makers on the reality of
the state of the public employee
pension system in the United States.
Public pension funds provide a regular
stream of retirement income for nearly
seven million workers.  In doing so,
these systems contribute to the
economy and retirement security of a
large segment of the nation's aging
population.  With nearly $3 trillion in
assets, these funds will continue to do
so unless they are undermined by
policy makers relying on flawed and
misleading information.
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Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on develop-




In Belleville Federation of Teachers,
Local 434 v. Belleville Township High
School District 201, Case No. 2007-
CA-0044-S (IELRB 2007), the IELRB
granted the Federation's request to
seek preliminary injunctive relief that
prevented the district from refusing to
comply with an arbitration award.
The arbitration involved a teacher's
aide who worked in a class that
consisted of educable mentally handi-
capped students. In February 2006,
the aide distributed to the students  a
flyer with the address of a website that
the aide maintained. The teacher of the
class and other district staff accessed
the website that same day and
discovered that the site contained a
link to pornographic images, although
most of the website was devoted to
professional wrestling. The aide
removed the pornographic link shortly
thereafter.
The arbitrator found that there was
no evidence that any student actually
accessed the website, and he concluded
that, in the absence of any damages to
the students, faculty, or school, the
aide's misconduct was a remediable
offense. However, the arbitrator did
find that the aide engaged in serious
misconduct so the aide was not entitled
to any back pay or benefits but should
have been reinstated no later than
April 30, 2007. The district acknowl-
edged it did not comply with the award
by reinstating the aide by this date, so
the union sought the preliminary
injunction from the IELRB.
The district argued that the award
was not binding on the basis that it
violated public policy. Although
awards that conflict with public policy
may not be enforceable under
AFSCME v. State, 124 Ill. 2d 246, 529
N.E.2d 534 (1988), the IELRB noted
that this exception is very narrow. The
IELRB employed a two-step analysis to
determine (1) whether there was a
well-defined and dominant public
policy at issue, and (2) whether the
arbitrator's award violated this public
policy. The IELRB determined that
there was a well-defined public policy
against distributing pornography to
minors so the issue was solely whether
the arbitrator's award violated this
policy. The IELRB determined, "The
question . . . is not whether an
individual's conduct violates public
policy, but whether his/her reinstate-
ment does so."  Since the arbitrator's
award allowed the aide to be suspended
for over one year without back pay or
benefits for his conduct, the IELRB
believed that the award did not
condone the conduct. In addition, the
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arbitrator considered the aide ame-
nable to discipline since he removed
the link on his website to pornographic
materials quickly after the events
occurred. Thus, the Board found a
significant likelihood that the district
would not be able to show that the
reinstatement violated public policy.
The district's refusal to reinstate the
aide since April 30, 2007, constituted
irreparable harm because it was a
continuing transgression and it may
have created a chilling effect on other
employees who seek to file grievances
against the district. Therefore, pre-
liminary injunctive relief was just and
proper.
Arbitration
In Peoria Federation of Teachers,
Local 780, IFT/AFT and Peoria
School District 150, Case No. 2006-
CA-0026-S (IELRB 2007), the IELRB
affirmed the Administrative Law
Judge's determination that Peoria
School District 150 violated Section
14(a)(8), and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA by
refusing to comply with an arbitration
award. The arbitration award was
entered in favor of a  teacher who was
terminated at the end of her third year.
The arbitrator found that the district
failed to comply with its Evaluation
Handbook. The award did not require
reinstatement but required the school
district to make a monetary payment
to the teacher of up to $10,400.
The IELRB noted that whether an
arbitration award is binding depends
upon a variety of factors. These factors
include whether the award was issued
according to the applicable grievance
procedure, whether the procedures
were impartial and fair, whether the
award conflicts with other statutes,
and whether the award is repugnant to
the purposes of the IELRA.  Here the
school district argued that the award
conflicted with another statute - the
School Code.  In particular, the school
district argued that it had the power
under the School Code to terminate  a
probationary teacher for poor perfor-
mance and that its powers under the
School Code superseded the collective
bargaining agreement.
The IELRB determined that the
arbitrator's award did not conflict
with the School Code because it did not
disrupt the school district's ability to
dismiss probationary teachers.
Rather, the arbitrator's award was
based upon her determination that
the school district was required to
comply with the procedures set forth
in its Evaluation Handbook.  More-
over, the award did not require the
teacher to be reinstated, but only
required a monetary payment. Conse-
quently, because it did not preclude




In Int'l Union of Operating Engi-
neers, Local 150 and Village of Lisle,
S-CA-05-043 (ILRB State Panel 2007),
the International Union of Operating
Engineers challenged the administra-
tive law judge's recommended deci-
sion and order. The ALJ dismissed the
union's allegations that the Village of
Lisle violated  of the IPLRA,  by not
giving members of the bargaining
unit an "equity" increase. The State
Panel reversed.
In January 2004 the union was
certified as the representatives of a
bargaining unit of sixteen village
workers. In May of 2004 the village
granted a pay raise of 4 percent to all
employees including those of the
newly certified bargaining unit. In
addition, the village granted all of its
unrepresented employees another 3
percent "equity" raise, but did not
grant the union workers a 3 percent
raise. The union argued that its
members should have received this
raise as well.
If the ALJ found that the May 2004
3 percent increase was not an
established practice and, thus, the
union members were not entitled to it.
The State Panel agreed that prior
equity raises were sporadic and
granted to individuals rather than
across the board. However, the State
Panel found that the increases in
question were different because the
increase was given in a uniform
amount and because the recipients
were all unrepresented village employ-
ees. Additionally the village did not
state a reason for departing from the
way it had given these  equity raises in
the past. Consequently, the State
Panel held, the 3 percent raises were
actually merit raises, their award was
part of the status quo and the village
was obligated to maintain the status
quo during negotiations and extent the
raises to the bargaining unit.
Futhermore, the State Panel found
that the reason the bargaining unit
employees did not receive the raise was
because they had exercised their rights
to organize.
Supervisors
In Metropolitan Alliance of Police,
Burr Ridge Command Chapter No. 13
and Village of Burr Ridge, Case No. S-
RC-05-109 (ILRB State Panel 2007)
the State Panel held that corporals and
sergeants in the Village of Burr Ridge
police department are not prohibited
from organizing under the IPLRA’s
supervisory exclusion. Section 3(r) of
the Act states that a 'supervisor is an
employee whose principal work is
substantially different from that of his
subordinates and who has authority,
in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
promote . . ., if the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires indepen-
dent judgment . . . ."
The State Panel agreed with its
ALJ's finding that the corporals were
11
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worker into the meeting, but instead
he was only allowed to bring a union
steward. Eppley filed an unfair labor
practice charge as a result. Eppley was
eventually discharged and then
reinstated with back pay after he
appealed to the Illinois Civil Service
Commission.
The State Panel explained that a
public employee has the right to union
representation at a meeting when: 1)
the meeting between the employee and
his or her supervisors is investigatory;
2) the employee reasonably believes
that disciplinary action may result;
and 3) the employee requests a union
representative. Here, the co-worker
Eppley wanted in the meeting was not
a union representative, and Eppley did
have a union representative at the
meeting. Thus, the EPA did not
violate the Act when it did not allow
the co-worker in the pre-disciplinary
meeting.
  
not supervisors because their princi-
pal work was indistinguishable from
that of subordinate patrol officers.
However, the State Panel reversed the
ALJ  and held that the sergeants were
not "supervisors," because their work
was also indistinguishable from that of
their subordinates. Although ser-
geants had day-to-day oversight
accompanied by the authority to
evaluate their subordinates, such
evaluation was separately reviewed
and approved by department heads.
Thus, because sergeants had little
discretionary authority in this review
process, they were not supervisors
under the Act.
The State Panel also held that the
sergeants were not supervisors be-
cause they lacked the authority to
grant grievances, even though they
were the first step in the grievance
procedure. Instead, sergeants merely
chose between two or more significant
courses of action, which did not
require the use of independent
judgment.
Weingarten Rights
Eppley v. Department of Cen-
tral Management Services
In Eppley and State of Illinois,
Department of Central Management
Services (Environmental Protection
Agency), No. S-CA-06-0 (ILRB State
Panel 2007)  the State Panel held that
the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) did not violate Eppley’s
Weingarten rights by refusing to allow
another employee to accomany Eppley
to a pre-disciplinary hearing.
Eppley sent an e-mail to union
officials, with blind copies to a number
of other individuals, expressing
dissatisfaction with the union. As a
result, several co-workers filed com-
plaints against the EPA, and in turn,
the EPA scheduled a pre-disciplinary
hearing with Eppley to review this e-
mail. Eppley attempted to bring a co-
(compiled by Yoo-Seong Song, Librarian,
Institute of Labor and Industrial Rela-










RIGHTS JOURNAL.  Vol. 19,
Iss. 1. pp. 17-30.
The goal of this article is to investigate
a general belief that police force
discipline is more lenient than that of
other public sector employees.  While
police discipline involves a complex
process and typically more time-
consuming than other discipline,
there has not been much research in
the area of police force management.
The author analyzes about 200 cases
that went to arbitration and draws a
conclusion that police discipline is not
much distinctive from non-police
employee discipline. The author writes
that among the cases, no clear
differences are found between police
and non-police employee discipline in
terms of case characteristics, case
outcomes, and arbitrator behaviors.
Rubinstein, Mitchell H. ASSIGN-
MENT OF LABOR ARBITRATION.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW. Vol. 81,
Iss. 1. pp. 41-76
The author of this article suggests
assigning the right to proceed with the
arbitration to the grievant, as a way of
reducing hostility and further litiga-
tion. The author describes several
reasons that may have affected unions
from doing so; however, this article
suggests that there are certain cases
in which assignment of labor arbitra-
tion to the grievant will lead to greater
satisfaction for the grievant, unions,
and employers.  The author hopes that
this article will stimulate further
discussion and development on this
issue.
(Books and articles anotated in Further
References are available on interlibary
loan through ILLINET by contacting
your local public library or system
headquarters.)
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